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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
WILLIE FOLKES, : Case No. 14330 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(ii) (1953), in the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Willie Folkes, was convicted by a jury of the 
crime of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute for value on November 12, 1974, before the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, of the Third Judicial District Court. The defendant 
was sentenced by the court to serve, one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison, the indeterminate term of imprisonment which is 
provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of guilt entered 
against him and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 26, 1974, two policemen 
(Officers Bell and Niemann) were stationed on the roof of the Rio 
Grand Products Building making observations of the street below 
for the purpose of facillitating the arrest of certain individuals 
unconnected with the present case (R. 3,32, 33, 51). While in the 
process of gathering data for those arrests, Officer Bell heard voices 
emanating from a second story apartment of the Baywood Apartment 
house which is immediately adjacent to the Rio Grand Products Building. 
Officer Bell testified that he saw a hand holding a syringe reach from a 
window of that apartment and squirt a clear substance into the alleyway 
(R.33). Officer Bell watched this activity for a short period of time 
and then signalled to his partner (Niemann) to join him beneath the 
window (R.33,34). The officers then together sat down immediately 
adjacent to the window of the apartment on the window ledge. The 
officers, desirous of getting close to the window to observe the 
activities occurring inside the apartment, positioned themselves on 
each side of the window at a distance of one foot from the defendant 
(R.37,51). Sitting in this position, the officers observed the 
movements and overheard the conversations of the appellant and the 
other occupants of the apartment by peering through the apartment's 
kitchen window. The officers observed activities which led them to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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believe that illegal drug use was in progress (R.3, 33, 34, 37). 
Officer Bell, from his vantage point, was able to observe the 
appellant walk into the bedroom and obtain an amber colored bottle 
from which gelatin capsules were produced (R. 36,37). Officer 
Bell at no time communicated this information to Officer Niemann. 
Officer Niemann did not observe this activity in connection with the 
amber colored bottle (R.6). After two and one half hours of this 
observation, one of the officers made a noise which drew the attention 
of the appellant. The appellant signalled to the other occupants 
of the apartment to be quiet while he proceeded into the bedroom 
to investigate the noise (R.40). The appellant opened the 
bedroom window and stuck his head through it. At that time, 
Officer Niemann identified himself, and with revolver drawn, entered 
the apartment through the bedroom window (R. 6,41). Officer Bell 
then stuck his revolver through the screen of the kitchen window and 
ordered one of the occupants to stand where he was. Once Officer 
Niemann had secured the kitchen area, Officer Bell entered the apartment 
by climbing through the bedroom window and climbing over the bed 
next to the window. The appellant and the other occupants were then 
arrested in the kitchen (R. 6, 41). Upon the defendant's arrest 
he was handcuffed with his hands behind his back in the kitchen 
(R. 6, 94, 99). Officer Niemann then proceeded to make a cursory 
search of the entire apartment (R.84). The search disclosed an amber 
colored bottle on a dresser in the bedroom (R.6,84). The bedroom was 
dark and the officer could not detect what, if anything, was in the 
bottle (R. 6,7). Officer Niemann had never seen the bottle during the 
alleged illegal drug activity, and indeed, saw it for the first 
time when he searched the bedroom (R.89, 90). The search was Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
undertaken after the defendant had been arrested and handcuffed away from 
the bedroom in the kitchen. The bottle, containing gelatin capsules 
filled with heroin, was introduced as evidence against the defendant 
at his trial. The police surveillance and arrest were made without 
a search or arrest warrant (R.8). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUE EMPLOYED BY THE POLICE, 
CONSTITUTED AN INVASION OF THE APPELLANTS RIGffiTTO 
PRIVACY SUCH THAT ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT 
THEREOF SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AT TRIAL. 
The seminal case on right to privacy in Utah is State v. Kent, 
20 U.2d 1, 432 P.2d 64 (1967). In this case, based on an informant's 
tip that the defendant was involved in a number of drugstore burglaries, 
a police officer requested permission and obtained it from a motel 
manager to use a hidden vantage point to maintain surveillance of the 
defendant in his motel unit. With the consent of the manager, the police 
officer entered the attic of the motel and peered through a ventilator 
located in the ceiling of the bathroom of the unit in which the defendant 
was staying. From this vantage point, the officer observed the entire 
bathroom and part of the bedroom. This surviellance was undertaken 
prior to the officer's procurement of a search warrant. In Kent 
this Court held that such surveillance was an unlawful invasion of the 
defendant's privacy rendering all the evidence seized by the police 
as a result of this surveillance and subsequent search inadmissible 
in the prosecution of the defendant for unlawful possession of a narcotic 
drug. The Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact 
that the observation of the defendant had not required the police to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
take any affirmative action such as removing vent covers or technically 
trespassing under common law property concepts. 
Applying reasoning that foreshadowed the United States Supreme 
Court case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), this Court 
dismissed the State's contention that the defendant's conviction 
and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence 
should be affirmed on the ground that there was no physical trespass 
or unlawful entry into the premises of the defendant. Citing 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), this Court said that the 
determination of whether there has been an intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area of privacy does not rest on whether there has been a 
trespass according to local property law. Instead, it was noted that 
although there may or may not be a trespass according to property laws, 
the gravamen of the harm is the injury to the individual's 
constitutionally protected right to privacy. The court emphasized 
that the home, even though it is merely a room in a motel, is a 
sanctuary, and a place where an individual has a right to be "free 
from outside intrusion and observation; a place inviolate where he could 
repose in security." (432 P.2d at 69) The obvious historical implications 
of intruding into one's abode in a free democratic society were noted 
by this Court. Fourth Amendment protections are just as inviolable 
in a motel room; and with only a few exceptions, a motel manager's 
consent was held not constitutionally sufficient to justify an officer 
making a warrantless search of a tenant's premises: 
-5-
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We are of the opinion the defendant, in renting the motel 
unit, obtained the exclusive right to use it, which 
included the right to privacy. It is true that this 
right may be forfeited by illegal use of the property, but 
such unlawful utilization must first be established by 
legal means. (20 U.2d at 1, 8, 432 P.2d at 68-69) 
The ratio decidendi enunciated in Kent inheres in the instant 
case with the same compelling logic. Although there was no initial 
trespass or physical entry into the appellant1s apartment, it is clear 
that under Kent, the surveillance made by the officers who eavesdropped 
without a search warrant by sitting on the appellant's window 
ledge violated the right to privacy in one's own home assured by the 
Fourth Amendment and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah Constitution. 
Private conversations as well as physical items are within the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The landmark United States Supreme Court 
case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), also stands 
for the proposition that eavesdropping activities employed by the 
government constitute a search and seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. In Katz, the government officers overheard the 
defendant's private telephone conversation by means of an electronic 
eavesdropping devise attached to the exterior of a telephone booth. 
In holding that the overheard conversations were the product of an 
illegal search and seizure, the United States Supreme Court said: 
"The Government's activities in electronically listening to 
and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy 
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone 
booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." (389 U.S. at 353). 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment protects not only 
property interests but protects all private activities of an individual, 
the Court in Katz, further stated: 
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection [Citations Omitted] But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public 
may be constitutionally protected.!! (Emphasis Supplied) 
(389 U.S. at 351) 
It is evident from Katz, and Kent that the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution!- protects that which one seeks to 
preserve as private as well as an individual's property rights. This 
protection extends far beyond tangible personal items and includes 
intangibles such as private conversations. Hence, a judicially authorized 
search warrant based on probable cause is a mandatory requirement for 
the seizure of private conversations and activities. Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
Prior to the Katz and Kent decisions, surveillance activities, 
standing alone, without actual physical entry by the police upon the 
premises, did not constitute a search and seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 
(1928) Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). However, the 
United States Supreme Court in Katz, overruling Olmstead and Goldman, 
both specifically rejected the contention that a search, for purposes 
T". As well as Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution which provides 
in language similar to the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people 
to be secure in this persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized.ff 
-7-
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of the Fourth Amendment, required physical entry onto the premises 
and held that police surveillance of private conversations, without 
actual entry or penetration onto premises, constituted an illegal search 
and seizure. At one juncture the Court said: 
ft[I]t becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment [the 
Fourth Amendment] cannot turn upon the presence or absence" 
of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure ~ . 
The fact that the electronic device employed . ~. did not 
happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no 
constitutional significance.ff (389 U.S. at 353) (Emphasis 
Supplied) 
Applying Katz, to the present case, it is important to recognize 
that the appellant's private conversations and activities which took 
place from 2:00 to 4:00 a.m. on May 26, 1974, within the confines 
of his private residence, were not exposed to the public and were 
to be preserved as private. Hence, the surveillance made by two 
police officers who were eavesdropping without a search warrant 
by sitting on the appellant's window ledge for several hours two 
stories above the ground, peering into his kitchen in the middle 
of the night and mentally recording his private conversations and 
movements so as to produce them at trial, constituted a shocking 
invasion of the appellant's privacy and an illegal search and seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article One, Section 14 
of the Federal and State Constitutions, respectively. The illegal 
search and seizure was made prior to arrest, by means of the surveillance 
despite non-entry by the police. Because the evidence obtained as a 
result of an invasion of the appellant's privacy was admitted at 
trial after a suppression hearing and over objections made by appellant's 
counsel, the appellant's conviction must be reversed. 
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The Katz decision and the rationale of Kent have been 
applied in many cases where the factual setting has been strikingly 
similar to that of the present case. In Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 
9 Cal 3rd 626, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973), the California 
Supreme Court held that evidence, both audio and visual, obtained as 
the result of police peering into the defendant's apartment, was the 
product of an illegal search and seizure and inadmissible at trial. 
The police in Lorenzana peeked through the defendant's window 
and observed him emptying some powdery contents of a tied-off rubber 
balloon onto a newspaper. Concluding that the substance was heroin, 
the police entered the apartment, arrested the defendant, and seized 
narcotics. Considering the Fourth Amendment claims made by the defendant, 
the court ruled that the observations made and the conversations 
overheard by the police who were standing next to the house in an area 
not open to public use were the products of an illegal search and 
seizure. If the surveillance had been made from an area normally used 
by the public, the evidence received therefrom would have been 
legally obtained and admissible at trial. But because the evidence 
was obtained by police stationed at a non-public vantage point, the 
surveillance activities constituted an illegal search and seizure of 
the defendant's conversations and movements. Holding that the defendant's 
reasonable expectation of privacy had been invaded, the court excluded 
the testimony of the police officers at trial. 
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The facts of the present case likewise indicate that police 
observed movements and overheard conversations from a vantage point 
outside the realm of public use and access. One would be hard pressed 
to conclude that the appellant would expect that members of the public 
would normally peek into his second story apartment window at 2:00 a.m. 
in the morning. Therefore, according to Lorenzana, any evidence, 
whether audio or visual, obtained by the police as a result: of the 
use of their non-public vantage point, located on the window ledge 
of a private apartment two stories above the ground at 2:00 a.m. 
must be excluded at trial. Katz properly applies in such a situation 
and hence the trial court's finding that the evidence so obtained was 
admissible constitutes reversible error. 
The assertion that the police had been authorized by the owner 
of the Rio Grand Products Building to use its roof for the purpose 
of observing prostitutes on the street below, does not vitiate the 
unlawful intrusion into the defendant's privacy, even though 
initial police observerations were made from the roof of the Rio Grand 
Building and not from the defendant's window ledge. The test for 
determining the legality of police surveillance activities is not 
whether the police had permission to use a non public vantage point, 
but whether the vantage point was in fact not normally used by or 
accessable to the public such that its use by the police would be 
an invasion of privacy reasonably to be expected by appellant. 
I n
 People v. Fly, 34 Cal. App. 3rd 665, 110 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1973), 
the police received permission from defendant! s neighbor to use his (the 
neighbor's) backyard as a vantage point for observing plants growing 
in the defendant's backvard. The nnlicc* II.QPH a t-pipcrrmo fn 
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identify the plants as marijuana and then arrested the defendant. 
In refusing to decide whether the use of the telescope was unlawful, 
the court concluded: 
MWe do not reach that issue [regarding the telescope] 
because we conclude that, on the record in this case, the 
evidence supports the finding that the officer viewed 
the yard on both occassions, from a vantage point as 
to which the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy." (110 Cal. Rptr. at 159) (Emphasis Supplied). 
According to Fly, it makes no difference that police have 
permission to use a particular vantage point for observations. 
With or without permission, if the vantage point is one as to which the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, any evidence 
obtained by the police from that vantage point has been obtained as 
the result of an unwarranted invasion upon the defendants privacy. 
If an invasion of privacy has been made, it is of no significance that 
police had non-judicial permission to make that invasion. 
A test has been formulated for determining whether police 
surveillance from a particular vantage point is an unreasonable 
invasion of the privacy of those being observed. In Cohen v. Superior 
Court, 5 Cal. pp. 3rd 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970), the police observed 
illegal drugs on a table inside the defendant's home by standing on 
the fire escape of an apartment building and looking through the window 
of the defendant's fourth story apartment. The court, in determining 
the legality vel non of the surveillance, expressed the following 
test: 
-11-
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MThe test to be applied in determining whether observations 
into a residence violates the Fourth Amendment is whether 
there has been an unreasonable invasion of the privacy ot 
the occupants, not the extent of the trespass which was 
necessary to reach the observation point. (85 Cal. Rptr. 
at 358) (Emphasis Supplied). " 
Applying Fly, and the test of Cohen, to the present case, it 
becomes immaterial that the police obtained permission to use the 
roof of an adjacent building as a vantage point. The material 
conclusion thatmust be reached is that the police, even while they 
were on the roof of the adjacent building and before they sat down 
on the appellant's window ledge, were utilizing a non-public vantage 
point as to which the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Regardless of any non-judicial permission to use the roof any observations 
made therefrom constituted an illegal search and seizure because the police 
had not received judicial authorization to utilize a non public 
vantage point as to which the defendant and other occupants of his 
second story apartment nearby would have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Cohen and Fly, supra. Therefore, to protect the appellant's 
and the public's constitutional right of privacy, precious to a free and 
open society, his conviction must be reversed. Katz, supra, See also 
Olivera v. State, 315 So. 2d 487 (Fla. App. 1975), Storry v. State, 
452 P. 2d 822 (Okl. Cir. 1969), Pate v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal App 
3rd 721, 89 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1970). 
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POINT II 
THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT'S BEDROOM AFTER HE HAD BEEN 
ARRESTED AND HANDCUFFED IN THE KITCHEN WAS BEYOND THE AREA 
WITHIN HIS IMMEDIATE CONTROL, AND THEREFORE VIOLATED HIS 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY, SO THAT ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT 
THEREOF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AT TRIAL. 
In dealing with the law of search and seizure as mandated 
by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah Constitution 
we begin with the proposition that any search conducted outside of 
the judicial process is per se unreasonable. State v. Kent, 20 U.2d, 
9, 432 P.2d 64 (1967). The rule has long been established that 
whenever practicable an officer must secure a search warrant before 
intruding into constitutionally protected areas. Trupiano
 v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). The interposition of a neutral and 
detached magistrate at the point where the probable cause determination 
is made is essential to safeguard an individual's Fourth Amendment 
rights because a police officer's judgment is necessarily colored by 
his prior involvement in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime.,f Johnson v. United States, 333 10, 14 (1948). The Court 
enunciated this principle in McDonald v. United States, 334 U.S. 451 
(1948): 
!fWe are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search 
warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, 
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between 
the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield crimina 
nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. 
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need 
to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right 
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the 
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the 
arrest of criminals . . . And so the constitution requires a 
magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they viol 
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the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to the constitutional 
requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without 
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional 
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course 
imperative." (334 U.S. at 455, 456) 
Moreover, the burden of justifying such an extra-judicial 
search falls squarely upon the State. United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). To meet this burden the State must: bring 
the search within one of the time tested and well qualified exceptions 
to the search warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971). 
One such exception to the warrant requirement is a limited search 
incident to a lawful arrest. The seminal case on this issue is 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In that case police officers 
armed with an arrest warrant arrived at the defendant's home, identified 
themselves to the defendant's wife, and requested and received 
permission to wait inside the home for the defendant. When the 
defendant arrived, he was placed under arrest, and permission was 
requested to fflook around11. Over the defendant's objection, the police 
conducted an intensive search of the entire house. Although no 
search warrant had been issued the police justified the search as one 
incident to a lawful arrest. After completing the search which occupied 
between forty-five and sixty minutes the police seized numerous 
items. At his trial, the State introduced a number of the items 
which had been seized during the warrantless search of his home. 
On appeal, the defendant attacked his conviction on the ground that 
the aforementioned items had been unconstitutionally seized. 
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The United States Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that 
the search had exceeded the constitutionally permissible scope 
of a search incident to an arrest. After a review of the case law 
which had uniformly emphasized the preference for a judicially 
approved search warrant, the court explained that the exigencies of 
the arrest situation mandated a limited exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
The Court felt that a limited search for weapons and destructible 
evidence justified dispensing with the warrant requirement at the 
point of arrest. However, in defining the constitutionally permissible 
scope of such a search, the court emphasized that the search incident 
to a lawful arrest must be "strictly tied to and justified by the cir-
cumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.ff (395 U.S. at 
762). Based on this principle, the Court concluded that a search of 
the defendants entire house following his arrest exceeded the limited 
scope of the very specific purpose which justified dispensing with the 
warrant requirement for a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest. 
Mindful that neither the premeditated nor the fortuitous circumstances 
of being arrested in one's home should license law enforcement 
officials to conduct general searches unsupported by probable cause, 
the court precluded this possibility by carefully circumscribing 
the scope of the search incident to a lawful arrest as limited to the 
arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control construing 
that phrase to mean "the area from within which he might gain possession 
of a weapon or destructible evidence." (395 U.S. at 736). Seeking 
-15-
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to preserve the Fourth Amendment protections by removing all doubt 
as to what are the outer limits of the phrase "immediate control,11 
the court went on to say: 
There is no comparable justification, however, for 
routinely searching any room other than that in which 
an arrest occurs . . . . Such searches, in the absence 
of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under 
the authority of a search warrant. The "adherence to 
the judicial processes" mandated by the Fourth Amendment 
requires no less. (395 U.S. at 763) 
Specifically rejecting the state's contention that a search of 
a man's house when he is arrested is "reasonable11, the Court 
stated/'Under such an unconfined analysis Fourth Amendment protection 
in this area would approach the evaporation point." (395 U.S. at 765). 
Accord: Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). 
Thus, it is eminently clear that the mandate of the Fourth 
Amendment, as interpreted and applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court in Chime1 
prohibits precisely that type of warrantless search and seizure as was 
conducted in the instant case. The appellant was arrested and 
handcuffed along with all the other arrestees in his kitchen (R. 6, 
94, 99). Following his arrest in the kitchen, one of the officers made 
2. This Court has also ruled such broad scale searches after an arrest 
to be unreasonable. State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d 422 (1971 
ruled a search of the" defendant's vehicle parked across the 
street from his home unreasonable, after defendant's arrest pursuant 
to a warrant. 
-16-
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a search of the apartment (R. 84) and seized an amber colored bottle 
found in the bedroom (R. 6) . It was -•. subsequently determined 
that the bottle contained gelatin capsules of heroin used as evidence 
against the appellant at his trial. 
Moreover, the scope of an unwarranted search incident to an 
arrest as delineated in Chime1 applies with particularly compelling 
force to the facts of the instant case. Significantly, the Chime1 
court specifically overruled both Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 
145 (1947), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
Rabinowitz involved the search of a single room incident to an arrest; 
Harris involved the search of a four-room apartment incident to an 
arrest. In both cases, the searches were predicated on the principle 
that law enforcement authorities had M[t]he right Tto search the place 
where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected 
with the crime . . . ." (339 U.S. at 61). The Chime1 Court specifically 
rejected this reasoning. 
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the warrantless 
search of the appellant's bedroom when he was arrested, handcuffed, 
and restrained by a police officer cannot be justified as a search 
incident to an arrest. Indeed, the search and seizure in the 
instant case falls precisely into that category of general exploratory 
searches condemned by the Chime1 Court in construing the Fourth 
Amendment: 
Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the 
facts of this case produces a clear result. The search 
here went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area 
from within which he might have obtained either a weapon 
or something that could have been used as evidence against 
him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence 
of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. 
The scope of the search was, therefore, ''unreasonable" under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (395 U.S. at 768) 
(Emphasis Supplied). 
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Failing to qualify as a Msearch incident to an arrest" exception 
to the warrant requirement, the Court in Chime1 made it clear in 
that the police should have obtained a search warrant before violating 
the petitioner's privacy any further. In the instant case, the 
police failed to do so. Appellant contends that Chime1 and the 
great weight of authority support the contention that this failure 
to obtain a search warrant was fatal to the search of the bedroom. 
As the Court stated: 
The State has made various subsidiary contentions, 
including arguments that it would have been unduly 
burdensome to obtain a warrant specifying the coins 
to be seized and that introduction of the fruits of 
the search was harmless error. We reject those 
contentions as being without merit. (395 U.S. at 768 
fn. 16) 
Appellant's contention that the search of his bedroom was 
beyond the area within his immediate control is buttressed by 
a decision from our own Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States 
v. Baca, 417 F. 2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969), the court concluded that the 
area within an arrestee's immediate control could be diminished when 
an arrestee was handcuffed with his hands behind his back. In Baca 
the appellant was arrested in his home for a parole violation. After 
handcuffing the appellant behind his back, his apartment was thoroughly 
searched by the arresting officers. The search included the inside of 
bureau drawers, night stand, and under the bed. The court concluded that 
these and any similar areas were hardly under Many type of control by 
Baca inasmuch as he was handcuffed with his hands behind his back 
and was unable even to dress himself." (417 F.2d at 105). In reversing 
and remanding the case, the Tenth Circuit went on to refer to the 
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Chimel case for the additional proposition that the general requirement 
that a search warrant be obtained is not to be lightly dispensed with. 
In this light, the Court stated that it was difficult to understand 
how or why it was not practicable for one of the officers to obtain 
a search warrant based on the probable cause which they had 
obtained by entering the Baca's apartment to effect his arrest. The 
ratio decidendi enunciated in Baca clearly inheres in the instant 
case where the challenged search of the bedroom followed the 
appellantfs arrest and handcuffing behind his back in a kitchen of 
his apartment. (R. 6, 7, 94, 99). 
This court has also had occassion to pass on a Chimel problem 
in State v. Sims, 30 U. 2d 251, 516 P.2d 354 (1973). In that case, when 
the defendant-suspect went to his bedroom to change his clothes, the 
police accompanied him for their own protection. Upon entering the 
bedroom, evidence later introduced at the defendantfs trial came into the 
officer's Mplain view." Justice Crockett, writing for the court, 
reasoned that the intrusion into the bedroom was justified under the 
rationale of Chimel to prevent the defendant-suspect from either 
escaping or obtaining a weapon. Sims may stand for the proposition 
that the area within an arresteefs immediate control was not limited to 
the room in which the arrest was made if the arrestee was not 
restrained and could still move from room to room. However, Sims is 
distinguishable from the instant case for two obvious reasons. First, 
the gravamen of the Chimel exception to the warrant requirement is that 
the exigencies inhering in the arrest situation necessitate a limited 
-19-
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search. In Sims, the defendant was not under arrest when the police 
accompanied him into the bedroom. Second, in Sims the defendant-suspect 
had essentially unrestrained freedom of movement in his apartment 
since he was not under arrest or otherwise in custody. In the instant 
case, the appellant was both under arrest and handcuffed behind his 
back. Baca stands for the proposition that the area within the appellant* 
immediate control, if anything, is diminished under such circumstances. 
The burden is on the State to demonstrate what exemption 
from the requirement that a search warrant be obtained justifies 
the warrantless search in the instant case. United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). The testimony at the trial offers no 
explanation for the search of the appellant's bedroom (R. 84). In the 
absence of some legitimate justification by the police for invading 
the appellant's privacy the search and seizure must be deemed to be 
unconstitutional, and the fruits of the illegal search should have been 
suppressed by the trial court. Wong Sun v. United States 371 U.S. 
471 (1963). The introduction of the tainted fruits constituted 
prejudicial error and hence the Appellants convictions should be 
reversed. 
POINT III 
THERE BEING NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE AMBER 
COLORED BOTTLE CONTAINED CONTRABAND, WEAPONS, OR EVIDENCE 
OF A CRIME, THE OFFICER'S EXAMINATION AND INTRUSION INTO 
THE BOTTLE WAS UNREASONABLE, M P THUS THE SUBSEQUENT 
SEIZURE OF THIS ITEH" WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID~ 
The United States Supreme Court and this Court carving out the 
judiciously limited exceptions to the search warrant requirement have Dig tized by th  Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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indicated that contraband, evidence and weapons which are in Mplain 
view" may be seized. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 402 U.S. 443 (1971). 
State v. Sims, 30 U.2d 251, 516 P.2d 354 (1973). However, such 
"plain view11 seizures are constitutionally reasonable under Coolidge 
only if four conditions are met: (1) The officer must be "lawfully 
present" where the search and seizure take place; (2) The seizable 
object must be in plain view; (3) Its incriminating nature must be 
immediately apparent; and (4) Its discovery must be "inadvertent." 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, and Ringel, Searches, Seizures, Arrests 
and Confessions Section 162 (1975 Supp. at 94). 
The appellant submits that the search and seizure in the instant 
case must fall on all four grounds enumerated above. The discussion 
in Point U of this brief discusses the question of whether the 
officer was "lawfully present" in the bedroom; he was not. The 
officer, having listened outside the appellantfs apartment for 
several hours prior to gaining entrance through the bedroom window, 
knew that no confederates were in the bedroom (R. 6, 82, 83) when he 
walked into the bedroom to conduct the search (R. 84). Thus, the State 
cannot justify the intrusion into the bedroom on the ground that it was 
necessary for the safety of the officers. 
Moreover, the testimony from the suppression hearing and 
the trial supports the appellantfs position that the search and seizure 
in the instant case must fall on grounds "two", "three", and "four" 
above. 
Even assuming arguendo that the object was in plain view, it may 
not be seized unless its incriminating nature is immediately 
apparent. Ringel, supra at 62. The purpose of this requirement as stated Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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by the Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, is to prevent the plain 
view exception from being used Mto extend a general exploratory 
search from one object to another until something incriminating at 
last emerges." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 444, 466 (1971).3 
It was only on this basis that the Court allowed the seizure of 
"mere evidence" in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In that case 
the Court upheld the reasonableness of the warrantless seizure of the 
clothes of an arrested robbery suspect, where the clothes matched the 
description of the robbers1 clothes and fell into "plain view" upon 
the arrest of the suspect. The crucial point is that plain view 
seizures are allowed as constitutionally reasonable when and only 
when probable cause exists to believe the item is seizable. As was 
stated by the Court in Sanford v. Texas 379 U.S. 476 (1965): 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants giving 
inferior officials roving commission to search where and 
to seize what they please. 4-
3"! The necessity of the illegal nature of the object being readily 
apparent is supported by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart 
in Stanley v. Georgia, 374 U.S. 557 (1967) which is cited with approval 
in the Coolidge case. In Stanley officials who had entered a building 
under the color of a lawfully procured search warrant specifying 
gambling equipment also seized several reels of film which on their face 
were not objectionable. Subsequently the defendants were charged with the 
possession of obscene film. Justice Stexvart in an opinion joined by 
Brennan and White, J.J. described the seizure of the film as "unwarranted 
and unconstitutional" because "[t]his is not a case inhere agents in the 
course of a lawful search came upon contraband, criminal activity, or 
criminal evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear that the 
contents of the films could not be determined by mere inspection." (394 
U.S. at 571, Stewart J. concurring). Accord: Shipman v. Alabama, 
Ala., 282 So. 2d 700 (1973); Armour v. Totty, Tenn., 486 S.W. 2d 537 (1972 
4. Or as indicated in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967) in the 
context of electronic surveillance searches and seizures, the requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution that a search warrant shall 
particularly describe the things to be seized prevents the^  seizure of one 
thing under a warrant describing another. (388 U.S. at 58) Accord 
Marron v. United States. 275 U.S. 192. 196 C1927} 
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The colloquy between the officer who conducted the warrantless 
seizure and the defense attorney at the suppression motion amply 
illustrates that the facts in the instant case do not establish the 
plain view exception (R.6,7): 
Q. What made you pick up that bottle? 
Why did you pick that bottle up? 
A. It was there, so I picked it up. 
Q. Did you see what was in it before you picked 
it up? 
A. No, the room was dark, and it was in an amber 
bottle, and that's why I picked it up to look. 
Thus, because the bedroom was dark and the bottle was amber, the officer 
did not know what it contained when it fell into his sight; in fact by 
his own admission he had no idea what it contained. A bottle sitting on 
a table is not incriminating on its face. The plain view exception 
requires that the officer must have an immediate knowledge that the seized 
item is contraband, evidence, or a weapon. That is to say, before 
governmental authorities may seize evidence or search into containers 
they must have probable cause to believe that (1) the containers contain 
contraband and (2) that the substance or evidence is in fact seizable as 
fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence of a crime. By the 
officerfs own testimony that knowledge is absent in the instant case.5 
5"! The Utah plain view cases are not to the contrary: State v. Martinez 
23 U.2d 62, 457 P.2d 613 (1969), involved a trench coat resembling that 
worn by the robber; State v. Allred, 16 U.2d 41, 395 P.2d 535 (1964), 
involved safety boots and coveralls matching the description of those 
stolen in a burglary; State v. Martinez, 28 U.2d 80, 498 P.2d 651 (1972), 
involved stolen stereo tape deck and two tapes; and State v. Sims, supra 
involved long strands of light brown hair matching those of the 
victim. 
-23-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In all of the Utah cases, the incriminating nature of the seized item 
was readily apparent to the police officers. No investigation or 
examination of the item was necessary to ascertain its incriminating 
character. The necessity of the apparent character or identity of 
the seized item is fundamtental to the concept of plain view. 
Certainly the common sense connotation of the phrase as well as the 
well developed case law requires no less. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has followed this rationale 
as well. In Faubion v. United States, 424 F. 2d 437 (10th Cir. 1970), 
the court speaking through Circuit Judge Hicky, suppressed weapons 
seized in the warrantless search of the defendants luggage where there 
was apparently no probable cause to search the luggage and no 
reason for the government agents to have failed to attempt to procure 
a search warrant. As was noted in that case: 
The fact that the police have custody of a prisoner's 
property for the purpose of protecting it while he is 
incarcerated does not alone constitute a basis for the 
exception to the warrant requirement. Preston v. United 
States 376 U.S. 369 . . . Brett v. United States, 4EZ 
F. 2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 19WT " — 
In a case factually close to the one at the bar, the Court 
of appeals of Maryland held the search and concommitant seizure of 
marijuana and methadone unreasonable. Taylor v. State 9 Md. App. 
420, 269 A. 2d 870 (1970). In Taylor, the defendant was lawfully 
stopped by a uniformed police officer and was asked to show the 
officer his drivers license and registration card. While talking to 
the defendant the officer noticed some brown envelopes and opened 
them. The envelopes and their contents were then seized and further 
analysis showed that they contained marijuana and methadone which 
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formed the basis of the defendant's conviction. 
In reversing the defendant's conviction the court stated 
the issue as follows: 
The officers right to seize the brown envelopes within 
the car was not therefore dependent upon or limited 
by the rules authorizing searches and seizures incident 
to a valid arrest; it depended upon whether he had 
probable cause to believe that the brown envelopes 
observed within the vehicle contained prohibited narcotics. 
(264 A.2d at 873) (Emphasis Supplied). 
The court concluded that on the record there was no showing 
of the requisite probable cause to know the envelopes contained 
prohibited and thus seizable narcotics. Although conceeding that 
the officer's expertise in such matters was important, the court 
concluded that from the record there was no showing of such expertise 
and that the conclusory statement of the officer was not a sufficient 
foundation upon which a showing of probable cause could be based: 
As heretofore indicated Officer Puepke testified that 
from his "past experience,ff he knew that the ubrown 
envelopes" which he observed "are used for narcotic drugs." 
He did not state the basis for or any facts supporting 
his mere conclusion, nor was his expertise in the field 
sought to be established. In short, beyond Officer Puepkefs 
"take it or leave it" conclusion that the brown envelopes 
were used for narcotics, there was nothing before the trial 
judge to permit him to intelligently assess whether Puepkefs 
belief had a factual basis amounting to probable cause in the 
constitutional context. (264 A.2d at 893) 
In the instant case there is no showing of even such a mere 
conclusion of expertise. On the contrary, the officer testified 
that he picked up the bottle because it was there, and for no other 
reason. Applying the rationale of Taylor to the evidence in the 
instant case the evidence must likewise be suppressed. 
-25-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Another case similar to the instant one, which predates 
Taylor also supports the contention of the appellant herein. In 
Carver v. Kropp, 306 F. Supp 1329 (U.S.D.C.E.D. Mich. 1969) the 
defendant had been arrested for attempted rape, inter alia. 
Incident to the arrest the officer searched the defendant discovering 
five two-inch by three-inch envelopes and what appeared to be a 
large amount of money. Upon finding these items the defendant 
became highly upset and started to stutter and stammer. (306 F. 
Supp. at 1330). The officer opened the envelopes and found what 
proved to be heroin. The District Court upon defense motion 
suppressed the evidence at the Habeas Corpus hearing, finding the 
search and seizure constitutionally impermissible. 
Noting that each envelope was not transparent and that each 
envelope contained approximately one tablespoon of heroin per 
envelope, and that there was no showing that the officer had any 
basis for believing the envelopes contained heroin, the Court 
suppressed the evidence. 
When the officer discovered the sealed envelope, did he 
have reasonable grounds to believe that the possession 
of the envelope was itself a felony? 
The envelope was not transparent and there was no 
trace of its contents on its outside. At the suppression 
hearing the officer did not claim that before he opened 
the envelope he thought it contained narcotics. In any 
event, it appears that before he opened the envelope the 
officer had at most a suspicion not reasonable cause to 
believe that it contained narcotics. 
The officer apparently thought he had a right to 
open the envelope because, as he testified, Mthe duties 
of a police officer are to seize any offensive weapons 
or incriminating articles from a defendant before he has 
a chance to dispose of them.n A police officer does not, 
however, have a right as an incident of an arrest to 
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conduct a general search for incriminating articles . . . 
[citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] . . . 
In this case the officer did not believe that the 
envelope contained a weapon and he did not have the right 
to open the envelope. Accordingly, I hold that the search 
of the envelope was unreasonable. (306 F. Supp. at 1331) 
Of note also is the case of State v. Gwinn, Del. Supr. 301 
A.2d at 91 (1973) where the Supreme Court of Delaware suppressed 
marijuana seized pursuant to an inventory of the defendant's 
vehicle. The court noted that although the police had the right to 
lawfully inventory the impounded vehicle, there was no reason to 
search a satchel found in the vehicle's locked trunk. The record 
in that case indicated nothing unusual or suspicious about the 
satchel, and that although the satchel was plainly visible its 
contents were not. (301 A.2d at 294). The court ruled: 
This brings us to the question of whether the contents of 
the closed satchel found in the trunk of the automobile 
came within the "plain view" doctrine. We think not. 
The record indicates nothing unusual or suspicious about 
the satchel. While the satchel itself was in "plain 
view" of the officer as he inventoried the contents of this 
auto trunk, the contents of the satchel were not in his 
"plain view" and do not fall within that doctrine. 
The opening of the satchel and an inventory of its 
contents were not necessary for the stated protective 
purpose. An effective sealing device or chain-lock 
device suitable for suitcases and other baggage found in a 
motor vehicle during an inventory would have sufficed 
for the security purposes sought. A detailed inventory 
of the contents of baggage appear to be an impractical and 
unnecessary, and therefore unreasonable, intrusion under 
the circumstances. Baggage usually contains innumerable 
personal items. The police should be relieved of the 
too-burdensome obligation of such inventory; and the 
citizen should be relieved of such impractical and unnecessary 
intrusion of his privacy. In this connection, it is 
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noteworthy that towaway and impoundment are daily 
consequences of certain parking violations. , 
(301 A.2d at 294). b 
Perhaps the seminal case on this issue comes from the State 
of Oregon. In State v. Elkins 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966) the 
defendant was arrested for public intoxication and a search of his 
person uncovered an unlabelledbottlexontaining three kinds of 
capsules and pills. The officer testified he seized the pills 
because he was suspicious and not because he recognized them as 
contraband. On analysis the pills proved to be unlawfully possessed 
methadone. The Oregon Supreme Court held the seizure of the substance 
unlawful on the ground that ffbefore the Officer had the right to 
seize the implements of a crime committed in his presence, other 
than that for which the arrest was made, he must have reasonable 
6. In circumstances similar to those in the instant case 
the Supreme Court of Alaska, in Erickson v. State, Alaska, 507 
P.2d 598 (1973) refused to approve the seizure of marijuana 
discovered in a suitcase. The court reasoned that it was 
the suitcase and not the marijuana which was in plain view and 
absent articulable reasons for believing the suitcase contained 
contraband the intrusive search of its contents was unjustified 
and hence unreasonable. The California Supreme Court in a 
similar situation also refused to apply the ,fplain view11 
exception. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P.2d 
665 (1968). 
Also in People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975), the court held that the State 
was not allowed to justify the opening and searching of an opague 
plastic bottle on the exception to the warrant requirement for 
objects or contraband falling in plain view. 
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grounds to believe that the article is contraband.' (422 P.2d at 
252) the court stated the policy behind its ruling as follows: 
If the rule were otherwise an officer who desired to 
inculpate an arrested person in another crime, could seize 
everything in such person's immediate possession and control 
upon the prospect that on further investigation some of it 
might prove to have been stolen or to be contraband. It 
would open the door to complete temporary confiscation of 
all an arrested person's property which was in his immediate 
possession and control at the time of his arrest for the 
purposes of a minute examination of it in an effort to 
connect him with another crime. Such a practice would be 
as much an exploratory seizure as one made upon an arrest 
for which no probable cause existed. Intolerable invasions 
of a person's property rights would be invited by an ex-post 
facto authorization of a seizure made on groundless suspicion 
. . . If contraband may be legally seized when the officer 
does not have reasonable grounds to believe it is such, 
7. The case is examined in Kamisar et. al., Modern Criminal Procedure 
(1974) at 332 n. 5. And, the principle has been recognized by the 
commentators as a correct statement of search and seizure doctrine. 
For example, in an annotation lfSearch and Seizure-Plain View," 
29 L. Ed. 2d 1067, the following comment appears: "It has been suggested 
that even if an object is observed in 'plain view,' the 'plain view' 
doctrine will not justify seizure of the object where the incriminating 
nature of the object is not apparent from the 'plain view1 of the 
object.n (Emphasis Supplied) 
See Comment, "Probable Cause to Seize and the Fourth Amendment: 
An Analysis," 34 Albany L. Rev. 658 (1970). This comment explores 
precisely the issue at bar, i.e., "the status of a seizure where the 
seizing officer did not know, or have probable cause to believe, that 
the item seized was a fruit, instrumentality, or contraband evidencing 
another crime." The author's conclusion is that such a seizure contra-
venes the Fourth Amendment. More recent writings on the subject 
simply accept this principle as a settled rule. See e.g. Knipers, 
"Suspicious Objects Probable Cause, and the Law of Search and Seizure," 
"21 Drake L. Rev. 252, 263 (1972); Scurlock, "Basic Principles of the 
Administration of Criminal Justice with Particular Reference to Missouri 
Law." 38 U. Mo. Kansas City 167, 198 (1970); Comment, "Search and Seizure 
Probable Cause for Seizure," 7 Suffolk.- U.L.Rev. 184 190 (1972) Rintamaki, 
"Plain View Searching," 60 Military L Rev. 25, 39 (197377 
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it will lead to many interferences with property when the 
officer's groundless suspicions are wrong. Nor can we be sure 
that the prevention of indiscriminate seizures of property 
upon lawful arrest will have no effect upon rights of privacy. 
If indiscriminate seizures are allowed upon lawful arrest 
it will tend to promote more arrests upon tenuous fanciful 
grounds. (422 P.2d at 254) 
Numerous other cases have followed the Elkins rationale. 
The Courts of Alabama, Delaware, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho and 
Maryland have explicitly rejected the idea that officers may seize 
objects ori suspicion and in following Elkins have required a probable 
cause determination before an object may be seized. This Court has 
apparently not ruled on the precise issue. 
In State v. Harwood, 94 Idaho 615, 495 P.2d 160 (1972), the 
Supreme Court of Idaho in an able opinion by Mr. Justice Shepard 
specifically followed Elkins in a case factually different than that 
at the bar. In Harwood the defendant's conviction for illegal possession 
of a game animal was reversed where the game warden was not able to show 
articulable facts which indicated that the seized animal carcass was 
in fact contraband. (495 P.2d at 164). Similarly in People v, LaRocco, 
178 Colo. 196, 496 P.2d 314 (1972) the defendants conviction for 
forgery of an out of state drivers license was reversed. In 
LaRocco, the police pursuant to a search warrant seized an Illinois 
drivers license inter alia when the warrant specified other instrument-
alities and evidence. The court rejected the states argument that the 
"plain view11 doctrine justified the seizure of the Illinois license, 
noting that "officers merely suspected the license of being contraband 
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and that not having been specified in warrant" a nexus must have been 
shown connecting it with the criminal activity being investigated 
under the search warrant." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294." (496 P. 
2d at 316). The court stated the basis of its ruling as follows: 
To countenance seizure of evidence not specified in 
the warrant and unrelated to the criminal matters under 
investigation would open wide the doors to general 
searches and seizures based upon mere suspicion but not 
upon probable cause as constitutionally required . . . 
[Quoting from Mr. Justice Stewart's concurrence in 
Stanley v. Georgia, supra] . . . 
Not having demonstrated that the items here seized 
were fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence 
connected with the criminal activity being investigated under 
the search warrant, and no probable cause being shown for 
their seizure, the order of suppression was proper. 
(496 P.2d at 316). 
In the same factual context see also Young v. State, Del. Supr. 
339 A.2d 723 (1975) and State v. Paul, 80 N.M. 521, 458 P.2d 596 
(1969). In Young, a prosecution from misdemeanor theft, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held the seizure unreasonable where officers who justifiably 
detained the defendant and saw a television set in his car, did not 
have probable cause to seize the set. In Paul, the New Mexico Court, 
suppressed the seizure of the defendants trousers and boots which 
were not specified in a search warrant authorizing a search of the 
defendants premises for coins taken in a school burglary. The Court 
suppressed the evidence indicating that the plain view doctrine without 
more (probable cause) would not justify such a seizure. 
In cases factually more apposite to the one at the bar, the 
courts have followed the Elkins rule. Shipman v. State, 282 So. 2d 
700 (1973), Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19, 327 A.2d 516 (1974), State 
v. Florance, Or. App., 575 P.2d 195 (1972) revfd other grds. 527 P.2d 
Q 1 
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195 (1974) and United States v. Thomas, 16 U.S. CM.A. 306, 36 C.M.R. 
462 (1966). An extensive review of the facts of each case appears 
unnecessary, basically each case concerned the seizure of substances 
which government agents suspected to be contraband drugs. Mr. Justice 
Bloodworth in Shipman v. State provides an exhaustive review of the cases 
in their factual context.** 
In each case the Court reversed specifically citing to 
Elkins inter alia for the proposition that before officers may seize 
evidence of other crimes they must have probable cause to believe the 
evidence is in fact contraband. In each case the testimony was similar 
(if not approaching the identical) to that of Officer Niemann in the 
instant case.9 
W. In Thomas military officers seized a bottle which was subsequently 
found to contain heroin. In Dixon officers seized pills which were 
found to be barbituates. In Florence the material seized was from 
plastic bags containing what proved to be cocaine. In Shipman 
the evidence was contained in cellophane bags which proved to be 
heroin. 
9. In Thomas "there was no evidence that Lively or Tarvin [the 
arresting officers] suspected the accused of using or possessing 
narcotics or had any reason on which to base such a conclusion11 
(36 CMR at 463). In Dixon Officer Greisz testified that he had 
,fno idea" what the pills were but seized them as part of the police 
departments inventory procedure and then "decided to have them tested" 
(327 A.2d at 523). In Florence there was no evidence that the officer 
recognized the substance as illegal contraband (515 P.2d at 197, 200). 
The Supreme Court of Oregon found that on the record the officer 
had sufficient expertise to determine the evidence to be contraband-
but did not disturb its holding in Elkins (527 P.2d at 1212). In 
Shipman the officer who saw the cellophane bags "testified he did not 
know what was in the packages except that it appeared to be some white 
substance. At one point he indicated it was white powder/' (282 
So. 2d at 701). 
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In all the cases the Court suppressed the evidence seized 
and based their deicsions on the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and 
the analogus state constitutional provisions which exist in an effort 
to prevent general exploratory searches. In all the cases direct 
authority from the United States Supreme Court was indicated as 
controlling. The Coolidge opinion, Marron v. United States,and Mr. 
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Stanley v. Georgia were deemed 
controlling. The reason for the rule is nowhere bettet stated 
than by Mr. Justice Bloodworth and cited with approval by the 
Maryland Court in Dixon v. State: 
The reason for this rule is apparent. If the rule 
were otherwise, an officer, acting on mere groundless 
suspicion, could seize anything and everything belonging 
to an individual which happened to be in plain 
view on the prospect that on further investigation some 
of it might prove to have been stolen or to be contraband. 
It would open the door to unreasonable confiscation of 
a person's property while a minute examination of it 
is made in an effort to find something criminal. Such 
a practice would amount to the fgeneral exploratory 
incriminating at last emerges1 which was condemned in 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra. Ex post facto justification 
of a seizure made on mere groundless suspicion, is totally 
contrary to the basic tenets of the Fourth Amendment. 
For an item in plain view to be validly seized, the 
officer must possess some judgment at the time that the 
object to be seized is contraband and that judgment 
must be grounded upon probable cause. (282 So. 2d at 704 
and 327 A.2d at 524). 
Finally, the intrusion into the bedroom and the seizure 
of the bottle only after the officer examined the bottle to ascertain 
what it contained belies that the discovery of its contents was 
not ffinadvertent." Inherent in the concept of the plain view exception 
to the requirement that a warrant be obtained before invading a 
defendant's privacy is the idea that without any purpose or effort 
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by the officer, an item of an incriminating nature falls inadvertently 
into his sight. Since the officer could not ascertain what was 
in the bottle, when the bottle fell into his sight, and because the 
bottle, was not itself plainly contrband, evidence, or a weapon, 
the officer was prohibited from examining it. At the point 
that the officer picked up the bottle, he lacked probable cause to 
seize the item. Picking up the bottle and carefully scrutinizing 
it to determine what it was is not an inadvertent happening upon 
evidence. The examination of the bottle can be analogized to the opening 
of a drawer or of a box to ascertain what they contain. Neither 
opening a box, nor opening a drawer, nor inspecting a bottle innocuous 
on its face fall within the ambit of the plain view exception. 
The search of and subsequent seizure of the bottle and 
its contents, which was subsequently determined to be the heroin 
which forms the basis of the charge in the instant case, cannot 
be justified under the plain view seizure as constitutionally 
justified. 
CONCLUSION 
Whenever, the State seeks entry into one's home for the seizure 
of the fruits, instrumentalities, evidence of a crime or other 
contraband it must do so within the ambit of a judicially secured 
and valid search warrant or one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. Searches and seizures, particularly of one's abode, 
conducted outside of the warrant requirement bear a stigma of 
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illegality which can be justified as reasonable only when the State 
bears its burden of bringing it within the time tested exceptions 
to the warrant requirement of both Federal and State Constitutions. 
No such reasonable exception to the warrant requirement exists in the 
instant case ,the initial intrusion into the privacy of the defendant1 s 
home was unjustified and not based upon articulable probable cause 
offerred for the scrutiny of a magistrate. Hence, the fruits of 
such an intrusive observation must be suppressed as evidence for use 
at trial. Importantly, the intrusion in the instant case was 
unreasonable not only in the initial abrogation of the appellant's 
reasonable expectation of privacy, but also in its intrusive scope 
after the appellant's arrest, in his own home. The search of the entire 
home after appellant's arrest and detention in one room, and the 
seizure of unknown items, which by happenstance turned out to be 
heroin capsules, smack of the baseless exploratory searches which were 
at one time justified by overbroad writs of assistance. The search 
of the appellant's home and the contents of that home in the instant 
case was unreasonable as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section 
Fourteen of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and hence evidence 
seized pursuant to that search should have been excluded at appellant's 
trial. Failure to exclude such evidence constituted reversible error 
on the part of the Court below. 
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For the reasons stated, it is requested that the judgment of 
the trial court be reversed and the appellant granted a new trial. 
DATED this / day of January , 1977. 
Respectfully submitte 
W. KUNKLER 
attorney for Appellant 
RONALD J. YENGICH .! 
Attorney for Appellant 
i 
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